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Summary
Euro crisis displayed its full blow in the spring of 2010. Its dynamics revealed 
deep-seated structural flaws at the core of the EMU. The productive Germany 
is tied via the euro currency union to countries that have lower productivity 
rates and inefficient economies. This union has been beneficial to the coun-
tries of Southern Europe so far since EMU inception, as it provided them with 
cheap credit. EMU showcased its problematic institutional design. Compared 
to mature federations, the institutional design of EMU is incomplete. On the 
one hand, there is a strong ECB that decides monetary policies for the entire 
euro area. At the same time, there is a lack of macroeconomic policy coordi-
nation for the same area. The budgetary and fiscal policies are set by govern-
ments of national states. This is of great concern for the vitality and robust-
ness of the EMU in the context of soft constraints imposed by the Stability 
and Growth Pact. In the first part, this paper will highlight basic structural 
problems that led to the current crisis of confidence in the common Euro-
pean currency. The second part intends to discuss the lack of monetary and 
fiscal policy coordination, while the third part analyzes monetary and fiscal 
responses to the crisis by the EU institutions and national actors. The fourth 
part seeks to portray some possibilities for overcoming deep-seated structural 
imbalances, and questions the likelihood of “gouvernement économique” as a 
new stage in European integration.
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Phases and Origins of the Current Crisis in the Eurozone
The global financial crisis came at Europe in three phases. The first phase was part 
of the American subprime crisis. Many financial institutions based in Europe were 
fully complicit in causing the financial turmoil by buying and selling derivatives 
as well as by acquiring risky assets. The second wave was a uniquely European 
crisis. European banks had taken massive positions in the Eastern European bank-
ing systems. For example, the Czech system was almost entirely foreign-owned.1 
Outstanding loans issued by Austrian banks in Eastern and South-eastern Europe 
climbed up to €293 billion which could be translated to a liability for each man, 
woman and child in Austria of €35.075.2 These banks began lending to Eastern Eu-
ropean homebuyers, with mortgages denominated in euros and Swiss francs rather 
than in the currencies of the countries involved. This allowed banks to reduce inter-
est rates, as the risk of currency fluctuation was pushed over to the borrower. But 
when the zlotys and forints began to plunge, these monthly mortgage payments 
began to soar, as did defaults. The industrial production in the Czech Republic in 
September 2009 fell 13%, while Czech koruna depreciated 7.1% against December 
2008.3 The same happened with Hungarian forint and Polish zloty. Hungarian forint 
lost almost 20% of its value and industrial production shrank by 9.9%.4 Poland suf-
fered greatly in terms of exchange rate depreciation as zloty plunged 23.3% at the 
time when industrial production decline amounted to 7.7%.5 The European core, led 
by Germany, refused a European bailout of the borrowers or lenders even though 
the lenders who created this crisis were based in eurozone countries. Instead, the 
IMF was called in to solve the problem.6 This raised the political question in Eastern 
Europe as to what it meant to be part of the European Union.
The third wave is represented by crisis in sovereign debt in countries that are 
part of the eurozone, but are not in the core of Europe (PIIGS countries). This wave 
showed that eurozone governments have failed to place common currency on a so-
lid political and economic foundation. Blaming the speculators garnered some ap-
plause, but this analytical approach appears to be too one-sided. Even without deep 
scrutiny, it is obvious that leaders of the eurozone countries behaved like specula-
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others because they turned a blind eye to the malefic dealings for too long. In the 
spring of 2010, a full-scale crisis erupted in the peripheral country with the shakiest 
public finances. The Greek crisis made it obvious that the sovereign debt crisis and 
banking crisis have become intertwined and could feed off each other in the near 
future. There are four major factors which caused the European banking crisis and 
preceded the global financial turmoil.7
The first factor refers to the euro adoption, which is directly linked to the Eu-
rope’s local subprime bubble. The cost of borrowing in peripheral European coun-
tries (PIIGS) was greatly reduced due, in part, to the implied guarantee that once 
they joined the eurozone their debt would be as solid as Germany’s government 
debt. Construction along the Valencian coast outpaced the building boom elsewhere 
across Spain, and accounted for more than 12% of the region’s economy in 2008 
(more than twice what it had a decade earlier).8 The industry created so many jobs 
that in 2006, near the peak of the boom, unemployment in the region, now a stagger-
ing 24% (September 2010), dropped below the national average, which is unusual 
in an area with big seasonal job swings.9 As a further example, in 2006 there were 
more than 700,000 new homes built in Spain, more than the total of new homes 
built in Germany, France and the United Kingdom combined.10
Europe’s “carry trade” and crisis in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) can be 
identified as the second and third factors, which are tightly interrelated and which 
augmented and accelerated the crisis. Because of this, Swiss francs and euros served 
as the basis for most of such lending across Europe. Loans in these currencies were 
then extended as low interest rate mortgages and other consumer and corporate 
loans in higher interest rate economies in CEE without analyzing the possibility of 
a sharp devaluation.11 Troubles of overexposed banks in Italy, Austria, Sweden and 
Greece have been solved by the IMF and the EU as they ended up bailing out se-
veral countries in the region, including Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Serbia. And 







system. This was in stark contrast to the conservative approach to development that long held 
sway here. Until recently, Spain was so frugal and had so little purchasing power that Spaniards 
referred to “Europe” as the continent beyond the Pyrenees.
11 In Latvia 90% of total bank loans were held in foreign currency, in Hungary 67%.
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ing a potential 150 billion-euro rescue fund for CEE countries at the urging of the 
Austrian and Italian governments.12
The fourth factor, the exposure to toxic assets, culminated in the aftermath of 
the Lehman Brothers collapse. In October 2009, RGE estimated the total poten-
tial eurozone bank losses to amount to €700-900 billion, a large share of which 
stemmed from U.S. and CEE exposures (Roubini et al., 2010). According to IMF 
estimates, German banks face total write-downs of US$314-338 billion, of which 
US$260 billion already recognized by end-2009, and with recapitalization needs of 
at least US$36 billion among public sector banks (ibid.). In addition, German banks 
hold claims of US$514 billion on the most imperilled peripheral countries (Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland), whereas French banks hold claims of US$387 billion on 
these peripheral countries (and a further US$508 billion on Italy) (ibid.).
Lack of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination
Problems facing the European financial sector were merely compounded by deep 
structural problems at the heart of EMU characterized by the absence of prudent 
macroeconomic coordination. The capital-poor and inefficient South was not as 
competitive as the efficient and capital-rich North, and ended up importing capital 
to make up the difference. Meanwhile, the eurozone had a political logic, but was 
economically flawed from the start because it attempted to wed 16 fiscal policies 
with one monetary policy. The need for coordination arises in contexts character-
ised by interdependencies, due either to the collective goods problem or to exter-
nalities. In such contexts, decentralised decision-making in the absence of coor-
dination devices will lead to suboptimal, non-cooperative, Nash equilibria. They 
result from the existence of collective goods, such as monetary stability or reputa-
tion on financial markets and vis-à-vis private agents in general, or from spillovers. 
Spillovers are to be interpreted as unintended consequences of national macroeco-
nomic policies on other member states economies, and such spillover effects may 
be positive or negative. In the first category, spillovers may be either positive – the 
so-called traditional Keynesian spillovers, that result from the multiplier effects of 
fiscal policies and their ‘locomotive effects’ through trade – or negative, mostly 
through induced rise in long term interest rates and fall in the external exchange rate 
of the common currency when budget deficits increase, as well as the short-term 
interest rates’ hikes that the central bank may want to impose as a retaliatory move 
when national fiscal authorities appear not to exert enough political will to contain 
budget deficits (Commission, 2004).
12 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,614960,00.html
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Because the European monetary union was conceived at a time when monetary 
stability was widely held to be the single, most desirable objective, and with the 
aim of minimizing centralisation, that is transferring only monetary powers at the 
supranational level, while leaving fiscal and tax policies almost intact in the hands 
of national governments, interdependencies stemming from the use of these instru-
ments were given most attention in the debate over economic policy. The precise 
rules and institutions that have been chosen for the eurozone in the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam treaties have been decisively influenced by the inflationary context of 
the seventies and eighties in the EU, as well as by the then dominant macroecono-
mic theories (rational expectations macroeconomics) (ibid.). But this specific con-
text also predetermined problems associated with the lack of coordination.
Also, from the beginning it was obvious that the eurozone is not an optimal 
currency area (OCA), as it did not satisfy some basic criteria regarding OCA. At the 
point when the euro was introduced as a means of payment, the eurozone fulfilled 
only two criteria regarding the OCA index, trade openness and production diver-
sification. Other two important criteria remained beyond the reach for 12 different 
economies, namely labour mobility and fiscal transfers. It is contestable whether 
EU members developed a certain level of homogeneity of preferences in their ap-
proach to solving macroeconomic issues.13 Commonality of destiny is also ques-
tionable, since the EU is an association, at most an alliance, and not a transnational 
state. As an alliance, it is a system of relationships among sovereign states, so they 
participate in it to the extent that it suits their self-interest or fail to participate when 
they please. That means that they approach the financial crisis in a national, as op-
posed to European fashion.14
Another serious issue is the stability culture imposed by the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Although the SGP has undoubtedly made fiscal policies a ‘common concern’ of 
the eurozone by focusing attention on fiscal aggregates of member states, it cannot 
be said to have significantly improved economic policy coordination. At the same 
time, the SGP turned out to be highly pro-cyclical, because it was mainly focused on 
fiscal discipline during cyclical downturns, and thus provides wrong incentives since 
it did not tackle the tendency to run expansionary pro-cyclical policies in good times 
and does not reduce the political inclination to ‘spend the money when it comes in’ 
(Šimović, 2005: 75-88). From the very beginning, the euro was actually far more 
vulnerable than investors and politicians were willing to admit. Several member 
states used the façade of a strong global currency primarily to blatantly live beyond 
their means. But it were precisely France and Germany that broke the fiscal deficit 
13 http://www.econ.ku.dk/okombe/intmonecon/slidesch13part2.pdf
14 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate
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rule and denied credibility to the application of the same rule in the time to come. In 
March 2005, the EU Council relaxed the rules under the pressure of those two coun-
tries which were facing high fines for not obeying the SGP (ibid.).
The EC said it was to respond to criticisms of insufficient flexibility and to 
make the pact more enforceable, but in reality it was euthanasia of an already half-
-dead Treaty. The Bundesbank ruled that the changes would decisively weaken the 
rules of sound financial policy.15 The ceilings of 3% for budget deficit and 60% for 
public debt were maintained, but the decision to declare a country in excessive defi-
cit was to be based on a new set of parameters: the behaviour of the cyclically ad-
justed budget, the level of debt, the duration of the slow growth period and the possi-
bility that the deficit is related to productivity-enhancing procedures (Šonje, 2010). 
The excessive deficit procedure is not to be enforced when deficit occurs as a result 
of some unexpected negative shock. Under the new provisions, the previous defi-
nition of shock as a result of influence beyond government impact is eliminated in 
favour of a government’s autonomy to determine what really constitutes it.16 Since 
joining the eurozone, the 16 euro countries have violated the deficit rule 43 times.17 
The Greeks fudged their statistics by including prostitution, black-market trade and 
gambling in the calculation of economic output. As a result, GDP rose by a stunning 
25 percent in 2006, and the deficit dropped to 2.9 percent.18 When it comes to better 
monitoring the member states’ compliance with SGP rules, an important role is to 
be attributed to Eurostat. A regulation reinforcing the audit powers of Eurostat has 
recently been agreed by the Council of Ministers on 26th of July 2010.19 But this 
course of action, which envisages more frequent and comprehensive regular statisti-
cal visits in the context of the standard Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), is under 
threat from undermining its efficiency unless the financial derivatives market is to 
be supervised. Credit lines disguised as a swap did not show up in the Greek debt 
15 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html
16 The behaviour of the cyclically adjusted budget is an arbitrary decision because it depends on 
the econometric approach and model assumptions. The excessive deficit procedure is not to be 
activated if there is a big difference between real and potential GDP, which is also subject to the 
same criticism as the structurally adjusted deficit. By that point, the pact had clearly been weak-
ened because revenues were antedated, expenditures were concealed, and debts were hidden.
17 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,682432-4,00.html
18 Ibid.
19 But further steps, including further strengthening of the professional independence of the Eu-
ropean Statistical System as well as Eurostat’s audit powers, should be considered. Sanctions for 
repeated statistical problems, such as lack of validation of data by Eurostat, should also be con-
sidered. The binding nature of the “European statistics code of practice” should be reinforced, 
and some of the minimum standards should be enshrined in a legal act. http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf 
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statistics, so the conclusion that the Maastricht rules can be circumvented quite le-
gally through swaps is ineluctable.20 This means that fiscal policy coordination has 
to go hand in hand with sophisticated oversight of financial markets.
With regard to fiscal policies, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ character of the rules may 
also prove harmful in a number of contexts, as illustrated by the case of Ireland in 
2001, formally in line with the deficit and debt requirements of the SGP, but in prac-
tice having too expansionary a fiscal stance, given the high growth, high inflation 
situation of the country at the time (Commission, 2004). Although GDP per capita 
in Ireland and Greece rose from 1999 to 2007 by an astonishing 59.6% and 39.3% 
respectively (compared to Germany’s 12.4%), this was only due to a credit bubble 
which signifies divergence instead of convergence among the eurozone countries 
(Ivčić and Cerovac, 2010). Wages grew faster than productivity, thus unit labor costs 
and inflation rose, while real exchange rates based on such unit labor costs appreci-
ated sharply. These structural problems and flawed conception of economic policy 
had only been exacerbated by challenges endemic to Club Med countries such as 
corruption, non-transparent banking systems, large social welfare outlays, overreli-
ance on the real estate and construction industries for recent economic growth and 
lack of manufacturing capacity.21
Crisis Management in the EU
The fact that the EU is based on the exclusive power of the member states’ national 
authorities and that these have shown to be extremely reluctant to give more power 
to the Union, results in the fact that dealing with systemic crises becomes almost 
impossible, unless there is a large degree of coordination among them, which has 
not been the case until today. EU’s response to the crisis so far can be characterized 
as discordant, with essentially every country looking to fend for itself (“capital na-
tionalism”). With each banking system tightly integrated into the political economy 
of each EU member state, an EU-wide solution to Europe’s banking and sovereign 
debt problems is far from certain. An approach to banking problems was largely con-
ducted on an ad hoc basis, as each government has taken extra care to specifically 
tailor its financial assistance packages to support the most and upset the fewest con-
stituents. The European Commission has only very limited latitude when it comes to 
20 In the Greek case, the US bankers devised a special kind of swap with fictional exchange 
rates. That enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual euro market value of 10 
billion dollars or yen. In that way, Goldman Sachs secretly arranged an additional credit of up to 
$1 billion for the Greeks. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html 
21 From 2003 to 2007, the Irish banking system imported funds equivalent to over 50 percent of 
GDP to fund a runaway property and construction bubble. http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/0,1518,719723,00.html
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combating the crisis. When fair competition within the EU market is not the issue, 
the Commission simply lacks the necessary tools to deal with the crisis. As a result, 
Europe today is only as strong as the 27 heads of government in the EU allow it to 
be. But views on many issues differ widely in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, Vienna 
or Bratislava, especially after the immediacy of the crisis is perceived to have passed. 
The EU member states are notorious for ignoring the Commission’s attempts to re-
primand them, and they tend to band together against the Commission, which has no 
public to answer to and no real enforcement powers against a sovereign nation. It is 
also very rare that one member state will vote to sanction another, for fear that it will 
have to deal with repercussions when it is in the hot seat itself. 
When analyzing the financial crisis management in the EU, one must observe 
that the wrong approach has been rooted in the financial supervisory failure, mone-
tary policy failure and fiscal policy coordination failure. It has enabled the uncon-
trolled leveraging of financial institutions, bloated public sector and the break-up of 
the ECB’s independence during the crisis. The European banking and sovereign debt 
crisis can be divided into the period preceding the introduction of the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Fund) and the period afterwards. The following pages shed light 
on Germany’s role in managing the crisis, since it is the biggest economy in the euro-
zone and almost explicitly shaped the eurozone’s responses in this turbulent period.
The overall approach to crisis preceding the Europe-wide bailout in May 2010 can 
be labelled as non-coherent; it showed the strong prevalence of national politi-
cal concerns in tackling systemic challenges. While the Greek debt problem was 
expanding into a risk to the global financial system, the coalition government in 
Germany remained stubbornly focused on another problem: the state elections in 
North-Rhine Westphalia. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, stirred up resentment 
against the Greeks by resisting to approve an early financial bailout for Athens, and 
sent completely different signals than the most important member of her cabinet, 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. Namely, he was tasked with reassuring the 
markets, while Merkel was trying to reassure the German public that she was not 
being soft on the Greeks. On the other hand, the German Finance Minister wanted 
to establish a European Monetary Fund while the Chancellor was against it.
 In the course of taming the sovereign debt and the European banking crisis in 
the spring of 2010, two basic reactions emerged. Their sheer size and broad scope 
cannot overshadow their partiality and lack of coherence. The first of them was to 
set-up the eurozone-wide €750 billion bailout plus a €110 billion rescue package for 
Greece (see Table 1 on the next page).22
22 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,694784,00.html
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The European leaders and the IMF made €750 billion available to help the eu-
rozone states teetering on the verge of an abyss, in case they found themselves in 
a financial emergency when market-imposed interest rates on government bonds 
spiralled out of control. They have not been bothered by the fact that the EU trea-
ties do not contain provisions for such aid. Indeed, they had already ignored the 
no-bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty when they agreed to rescue Greece. In 
February 2009, German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück openly stated that if one 
of the euro countries encountered financial difficulties, the community will have 
to come to its aid.23 There is a de facto bail-out agreement among the euro coun-




EUROS SOURCE DESCRIPTION AVAILABILITY
60 billion EU Balance of 
Payments Facility
Originally a fund to help 
Central/Eastern Europe 
states, expanded in volume 
and purpose to now also 
apply to the eurozone
Immediate, the fund 
is already set up
Up to 150 
billion
IMF IMF resources that can be 
tapped to help eurozone 
states in need, with 









New facility that will 
issue debt guaranteed by 
contributing states so that 
it can purchase the debt 
of the troubled eurozone 
economies
Guarantees must be 










liquidity for three- and six-
month durations in addition 
to directly purchasing 
government debt
Already operational
Table 1. €750 billion bailout
Source: STRATFOR
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The second response came in the form of ECB-provided unlimited volume of 
loans to any bank that could offer qualifying collateral, while national governments 
offered their own guarantees on the newly-issued debt. The independence of the 
European Central Bank, once held a taboo in order to keep the value of money sta-
ble, has been sacrificed in order to restore liquidity to the banking sector and to ease 
pressure on the price of PIIGS government bonds. Essentially it was conducted in 
five major steps:
1. Governments incur debt: The competition between investors bids the bond 
prices up, in turn lowering the bond’s yield. 
2. Private banks buy government debt: Since October 2008, the ECB has of-
fered to fully accommodate the banks’ demand for liquidity, provided they 
pledged eligible collateral such as government bonds, and has offered to 
lend the liquidity for periods up to three, six or even 12 months.
3. Private banks use government debt as collateral: The ECB decided to lower 
the threshold at which it would accept government debt (from A- to BBB-) 
– giving all countries, but especially those in crisis like Greece and Portu-
gal, a breather. Further credit downgrades would make its bonds ineligible 
as collateral at the ECB, but even barring further downgrades, the lowered 
collateral threshold is set to expire on Jan. 1, 2011, which would mean that 
as it stands, Greek bonds would be ineligible unless they get back up to A- 
by then.25
4. Banks purchase more debt: European banks have jumped at this opportu-
nity to refinance their assets with the ECB at the very attractive fixed rate 
of 1 percent. The one-year liquidity operations have been very popular – in 
2009, banks took out 442 billion euro in June, 75 billion euro in September 
and 96 billion euro in December.26
5. Government debt yields kept low: This “loans-backed-by-bonds-to-pur-
chase-loans-backed-by-bonds” cycle keeps the yields low due to continued 
demand to use them as collateral with the ECB.
By buying up the debt of Club Med countries, the ECB kept the price of bonds 
artificially high. French banks benefited in particular from this policy because it 
enabled them to sell their Greek bonds to the ECB, an inexpensive way of cleaning 
up their balance sheets.27 The continuation of this policy effectively poses a serious 
risk of the ECB becoming a so-called “bad bank” or a bank that buys up toxic assets 
25 http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100224_eu_extended_liquidity_support_ecb
26 Ibid.
27 France’s banks and insurance companies had a total of about €80 billion in Greek government 
on their books. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet caved in to massive pressure from French 
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as a means of helping out other institutions. The central bank’s capital, currently 
about €70 billion, most of which is invested in the national central banks, would be 
severely affected in the case of default.28 Economists who have always believed that 
a few days of robust ECB market intervention would be enough to reassure market 
players and bring yields back to a normal level were mistaken. Without the immedi-
ate installation of any sovereign default mechanism such as some sort of European 
Monetary Fund, the ECB would have to bear the burden. It would run the risk of 
degenerating towards the “bad bank” of the euro area if timid investors offloaded 
sovereign bonds with uncertain repayment values on the ECB’s balance sheet.29
The next step to combat the magnitude of the financial crisis in Europe with 
a view to bolstering the ECB’s actions and the credibility of the newly-established 
European bailout package was seen in the austerity measures. EU governments 
have undergone rounds of belt-tightening measures, including cutting social servi-
ces and raising retirement ages. Even Germany, Europe’s strongest economy, 
pushed through its own far-reaching savings package. Announced austerity mea-
sures in Spain climbed up to €65 billion, in Italy €24 billion, Greece €35 billion, 
Ireland €15 billion, and Germany €80 billion.30 To resolve the bloated budget defi-
cits of the Club Med countries and as an assurance that it would not have to bail out 
every southern country like Greece, Berlin has demanded that these countries im-
plement severe budget cuts and that southern European countries begin implement-
ing the German-style labor market and public sector reform. This kind of direction 
establishes some sort of credibility for the EFSF, but it denies the potential risks of 
such a conception.
Prolonged bickering over the Greek bailout led to market uncertainty that spread 
to the rest of the eurozone, forcing Germany to eventually underwrite the 750 bil-
lion euro bailout for the eurozone as a whole.31 Near the end of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, Germany realized that it needed to develop a mechanism to enforce its 
will without acquiring the approval of other EU states if further eurozone countries 
President Nicolas Sarkozy (http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697680,00.
html).
28 The member states could then inject new capital into the ECB, which is problematic regard-
ing the level of their indebtedness. The other two solutions are recapitalization by issuing bonds 
or firing up the printing press. The German Finance Minister will feel the effects of this policy 
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were to be bailed out. Not only was it obvious that Germany was sitting in the same 
boat with other member states breaking the SGP rules, but it also wanted to obtain 
a mechanism to help their own banks under threat of bearing the costs of unorderly 
proclaimed bankruptcies. Its solution was the EFSF. The EFSF is not an EU insti-
tution like the European Commission or any other bureau.32 Rather, it is a limited 
liability corporation registered in Luxembourg. Specifically, it is a Luxembourger 
bank. This arrangement allows the Germans to evade the pre-existing EU Treaty 
law. The EFSF can therefore bail out member states, indirectly regulate the banking 
sector, set up a “bad bank” to rehabilitate European financial institutions, or favour 
one member or penalize another without a unanimous vote, which clearly represents 
actions explicitly or implicitly barred by the EU Treaty law. The EFSF requires no 
act by the Commission, no additional approval from 27 different parliaments and no 
unanimous vote among the various EU heads of government to forward its loans.33
The eurozone has thus far been exceedingly economically beneficial to Ger-
many. Berlin’s 151 billion euro contribution to the two bailout funds pales in com-
parison to the overall boost in exports that Berlin has received since forging the 
eurozone. Furthermore, Germany’s banks are looking at approximately 520 billion 
euros worth of direct exposure to various forms of debt in Greece, Portugal, Spain 
and Italy.34 The crisis has spurred member states toward economic reform for dif-
ferent reasons. The Club Med countries will do anything to get financial support, 
while Germany and Northern European economies will give less priority to sove-
reignty of legitimate concerns that a Greek collapse will harm their own economies. 
This kind of crisis management shows an underlying nationalist calculus, and not 
an integrationist “European” one.
After a long and protracted debate on the need of imposing automatic sanctions 
against fiscally irresponsible EU governments, which was essentially Germany’s 
rationale, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy came 
to a compromise on reforms to European fiscal rules. On 19th of October in Dau-
ville, Germany accepted the French demand that a permanent stability fund be set 
up to prevent future existential crises in the eurozone.35 This amounts de facto to 
the inception of the European Monetary Fund under Germany’s control, which out-
raged other member states which were held aside. The French side accepted Ger-
man demands for stricter enforcement mechanisms regarding fiscal policy rules 
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EU member states would still retain the ability to vote whether to give the Europe-
an Commission the authority to first launch an excessive budget deficit procedure 
against the offending eurozone member state, a concession France and a number 
of Mediterranean countries wanted in exchange for agreeing to reform the Treaty 
along the proposed lines.36 The process of trying to impose new sanctions could be 
affected by the “reverse majority” rule.37
The lack of coherence in the overall approach to financial crisis management 
can be seen in the stance of the German Chancellor, who displayed an elastic lo-
yalty to principles when the European common currency experienced turbulence. 
She initially spent weeks postponing the idea of aiding Greece. In the end, Germany 
shouldered the largest share of the bailout. As the euro crisis became increasingly 
dangerous, and additional countries ran into difficulties, she resisted a bailout pack-
age for the entire eurozone. In the end, Germany once again had to pay the largest 
contribution. Her latest U-turn when it comes to automatic sanctions certainly does 
nothing to instil confidence in the embattled euro.38 It seems as though a blend of 
ideological prejudices, financial interests and dogmas cloaked as national interests, 
political calculation and the lack of common historical experience in financial crisis 
management, produced a wrong set of answers. In fact, the only idea worth of praise 
was that bondholders and investors would be expected to shoulder the costs of bail-
ing out EU member states in the future, as some member states such as Greece and 
Ireland are insolvent.39 E.g. Professor Morgan Kelly of University College Dublin 
estimates that the cost of the Irish financial sector bailout amounts to €70 billion, 
which means that under this scenario every single eurocent paid in income tax in the 
next seven years is earmarked for that purpose.40
The instrumentalisation of the euro as a common currency shows the extent to 
which banks still hold the power. The ECB has never given way to politicians when 
they ask it to lower rates or to privilege growth over the fight against inflation, but 
this time it has caved in to pressure from the banks. This is only the first of many 
36 http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_remaking_eurozone_german_image
37 In practice this would mean that any recommendations of the European Commission to im-
pose sanctions on a member state could be contested if rejected by a qualified majority of fi-
nance ministers. The sanctions do become quasi-automatic if EU states authorize the European 
Commission to go forward with an excessive debt procedure and the offending country does not 
remedy the excessive deficit within six months. In that case, only a qualified majority vote of 
member states or compliance would be able to halt the clearly defined, automatic sanctions, so 
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misconceptions affecting the eurozone. The second and even more dangerous one 
is to impose drastic austerity measures in order to cut public debt and fiscal deficit 
in a deflationary context. In sum, both of the following statements are true: coun-
tercyclical spending worsens government finances, and austerity compounds an al-
ready miserable unemployment situation. But cutting spending in the middle of 
a recession is no solution, especially when market participants conflate stimulus 
spending with bailouts of the financial system. Such a strategy may sound sensible, 
but it relies on the same fallacy of composition that brought on the banking crisis. 
Economist Michel Aglietta said: To impose crushing austerity measures on Greece 
and pretend that it will pull through by itself in a context of internal recession, likely 
deflation and the feeblest European growth rates, is to set a time bomb that could 
cost Europe dearly (Belkaïd, 2010).
The final misconception manifests itself in the sense that new regulatory bo-
dies with brand new names but no teeth replace the old ones in the hope that the 
gap between regulators and financial markets could be bridged.41 Since the euro cri-
sis erupted, this sort of palliative measure has been introduced, e.g. the European 
Systemic Risk Board.42 It is also worthwhile to mention other three important bo-
dies which started to operate on 1st of January 2011: European Banking Authority, 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and European Securities 
and Financial Market Authority. Still, none of the statesmen and EU citizens can 
rest while the key problem remains unsolved. Last June, parliamentarians of vari-
ous political stripes asked for help as they published a warning that the asymmetry 
between the power of this lobbying activity and the lack of counter-expertise poses 
a danger to democracy.43 They called on NGOs, trade unions, academic researchers 
and think-tanks to get together to counter the financial lobbyists.44 The urge to act is 
severe, but all the while it is obvious that Europe has no long-term and broad vision 
41 http://www.ripe.hanfa.hr/edukacija/tekstovi/nova-struktura-za-nadzor-financijskog-sektora-
eu-a 
42 ESRB is an independent EU body responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the finan-
cial system within the Union. Its seat is in Frankfurt am Main. Its secretariat is ensured by the 
ECB. The ESRB contributes to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stabi-
lity in the Union that arise from developments within the financial system. It takes into account 
macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods of widespread financial distress. http://
www.financialregulationforum.com/wpmember/european-systemic-risk-board-5233
43 http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html 
44 Expert Group on Banking, which was recently formed to advise the European Commission’s 
directorate general in charge of EU policy related to the financial services sector, faced the same 
obstacle when the group held its first meeting, on June 14. Only four of its 40 members did not 
have the background from the world of banking and financial markets. http://www.spiegel.de/
wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,708241,00.html 
Brkić, L., Kotarski, K., Managing Crisis in the Eurozone
21
when it comes to solving the financial crisis and rebalancing its economies. There-
fore, better economic governance, which entails fiscal policy coordination together 
with financial market regulation and supervision, is desperately needed in order to 
build a stronger EU. This will be discussed in the following chapter.
Short History of the Attempts to Create Gouvernement Economique 
At the 1969 summit in The Hague, the heads of states and government decided to 
explore a possible path to EMU. Pierre Werner, Prime Minister and Finance Minis-
ter of Luxembourg, drafted the blueprint together with a group of experts. The plan 
encompassed three stages to reach EMU by 1980. On the institutional side, it envi-
sioned setting up two supranational bodies: a ‘Community System for the Central 
Banks’ and a ‘Centre of Decisions for Economic Policy’ (Cini, 2007). The former 
would pursue monetary policies, and the latter would coordinate macroeconomic 
policies. Nevertheless, the combination of the first oil shock impact and the crum-
bling of the Bretton Woods arrangement postponed those efforts to a later date. Ten 
years later, a new attempt at creating EMU was pushed forward by launching the 
European Monetary System. Germany insisted that a further monetary integration 
could occur only after other participating countries reduced their inflation rates to 
German levels and pledged to create a European institution on technocratic and an-
ti-inflationary rules: a politically independent European central bank to replace the 
Bundesbank and strict rules governing national fiscal policies. The other major par-
ticipants in the EMS, France and Italy, resisted these demands until the early 1990s, 
since implementing them would have required a politically painful tightening of 
monetary and fiscal policies to reduce inflation. French and Italian decision-makers 
preferred that the EMS evolve in a more politicized direction that would require 
participating governments to set common economic policy priorities, which would 
provide a platform from which the French and the Italians could press Germany to 
soften its monetary policy and influence aggregate demand (Walsh, 2001: 59-80).
Preferences regarding European monetary institutions did not converge during 
the 1990s. The French and the Italians continued to propose the centralization of 
economic policy authority in political bodies and giving greater weight to employ-
ment and the coordination of countercyclical economic policies, whereas German 
preferences leaned in the opposite direction, toward buttressing the independence 
of the European Central Bank and limiting fiscal policy flexibility. German nego-
tiators succeeded in pushing through the Stability Pact’s requirements for the mana-
gement of the single currency against the opposition of most other states, although 
they did concede that states could temporarily run excessive deficits under certain 
circumstances and that the EcoFin would have a modest degree of leeway in inter-
preting national fiscal policies. The German government also succeeded in curtail-
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ing the long-standing French desire for a political counterweight to the European 
Central Bank by insisting that the Euro Council remain an informal consultative 
body that would not question the central bank’s power to make decisions regarding 
monetary policy (Walsh, 2001: 59-80).
Any system of economic management has to balance competing aims and proposals 
for reform of the ECB and the SGP. Even so, a cursory look at how policy is being 
coordinated in the EU shows not only that there is much of it going on, but also that 
it is being done through an eclectic range of approaches. The underlying question, 
however, is whether current arrangements provide a policy framework that is ro-
bust enough for what EMU will become five, ten or twenty years hence. There are 
four different scenarios when it comes to coordinating economic governance (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Possible scenarios for economic governance in the EU
Source: Commission (2004, August)
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Bounded coordination describes a scenario in which the rules for policy co-
ordination are becoming dead letters, at best symbolically followed and routinely 
ignored when formulating national responses to economic policy challenges. This 
scenario amounts to a status-quo ex-ante minus (Commission, 2004). 
Loose coordination means that participants follow largely opportunistic strate-
gies and that they comply when the benefits are obvious and the costs negligible. 
With regard to the question of scope for policy coordination, we would find only 
little changes.
Tight coordination can be seen as an upgraded status-quo ex-ante scenario, 
where the EU-level institutions, procedures and goals of economic governance en-
joy strong support, where participants are ready to accept costs for reaching com-
mon goals, and where political actors are adhering to and extending ‘the spirit of 
policy coordination’ (ibid.). 
Finally, one can envisage a transformation scenario, in which member states 
and EU institutions alike are increasingly being socialised into collective coordina-
tion. This is understood as a governing arrangement, which builds up mutual trust 
through deliberative problem-solving rather than instrumental bargaining and does 
only rarely need to use the provisions for qualified majority voting (ibid.). Collec-
tive coordination might also be viewed as the fulfilment of demands calling for the 
establishment of a “gouvernement économique”, although the actors of this evolv-
ing “core network” would encompass not only national governmental actors, but 
also European institutions such as the Commission and the ECB, and European 
social partners. In the wake of the crisis, Herman van Rompuy told the press: We 
consider that the European Council should become the economic government of the 
EU and we propose to increase its role in economic surveillance and the definition 
of the EU’s growth strategy.45 
At the moment, the fear of a financial Armageddon has disappeared and crisis 
management rules have not been institutionalized. This means that Europe is cur-
rently heading towards a loose coordination which means a fragmentation scenario 
in the future. 
Conclusion
The fact that the European Union is based on the exclusive power of the member 
states’ national authorities and that these have shown to be extremely reluctant to 
give more power to the EU, results in the fact that dealing with systemic crises be-
comes almost impossible today. The recent experience casts into question whether 
45 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/7521434/EU-draws-up-plans-for-
single-economic-government-to-prevent-crisis.html
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any economic recovery can occur as long as the financial markets are able to bet 
massively against the European integration project in the absence of coherence and 
congruence among key political decision-makers. Adding to the standard line of 
conflict between supranational authorities and member states, we have to point to a 
second line of conflict, which is almost impossible to solve without further integra-
tion steps, and that is the conflict between nation states and financial markets. This 
effectively underlines the need for EU’s integrated measures for macro-economic 
stimulation such as integrated tax structure, a central bank dedicated to economic 
prosperity, and a reduction of the financial sector. Cutting down the financial sec-
tor can be achieved by regulation, by taxation and by restructuring the debts of the 
Mediterranean states (Galbraith, 2010). A more ambitious reflection would try to 
explore the possibilities of developing an original brand of highly decentralised 
federalism in which the central budget would remain relatively small, but in which 
an appropriate mix of rules and financial incentives, in the European budget, would 
be set up in order to induce national governments to undertake actions that are col-
lectively considered to be in the common interest. The past decade has been a lucky 
time in Europe, but the ongoing downturn will test the eurozone cohesion. Barry 
Eichengreen claims: A crisis is a terrible thing to waste.46 Europe must choose. The 
choice is between the disastrous radicalism of budget cuts and a constructive radi-
calism of full employment. Or between a disastrous radicalism of bank bailouts and 
a constructive radicalism of social development (Galbraith, 2010).
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